|
Emperor NHN TNG and the War of Defense in 1285
by L Mạnh Tht
As it has been said before, it was just in 1279
when Emperor Nhn Tng ascended the throne and the Sung Dynasty was
exterminated in China that Kublai Khan gave orders for warships to be
built in his plan of invading Đại Việt. His intention seemed to take
advantage of the victory his well-trained troops had just gained as an
impetus for their campaign to smash our peoples fighting power. From his
own experience in the war of 1258, however, Kublai Khans preparation of
tactics and strategy for this war showed to be much more elaborate. In
addition to the north-eastern and south-western armies, he attempted to
form the third one south of our country by ordering So Tu to occupy Champa
in 1282. In reality, the war proceeded exactly in the strategy he had
planned, yet the effect was not so satisfactory as he had expected.
Kublai Khans Preparation for the War of 1285
Despite his failure to impose the puppet government headed by Trần Di
i upon our country, Kublai Khan patiently expected a victory from the
battlefield of Champa. Unfortunately, his expectation could not come true
as it is noted in Pen Chi of Yuan Shih 13, pp.2b2-3 and 2b9-11, that the
defeated army of So Tu had to retreat from Champa and Ping Chang A Li
Hai Ya of Hu Kwang Hsin Shng volunteered to reach the seashore to gather
beaten troops [fleeing] from Champa. Obviously, in the long-termed
strategy of resistance by combining fighting with negotiation, the Cham
people had sunk So Tus troops in the swamp of a guerilla warfare in
their tropical country. Having received only requests for reinforcement in
stead of some expected victory, on the 28th, Đinh Sửu, of the 5th month of
Chih Yuan 21 (1284) Kublai Khan stripped Wu Ma Er of his commanding seal
due to his failure of supplying So Tu with reinforcements. Then, on the
12th, Mậu T, of the 7th month of the same year he ordered his son, To
Huan, officially to command troops to attack Champa, as recorded in Pen
Chi of Yuan Shih 13, p.4a8. Yet, it was merely a pretense of his since the
objective of To Huans invading troops was not Champa, but Đại Việt. Just
on the same day, Mậu T, by order of Emperor Nhn Tng, the mission of
Trung Lương Đại Phu Nguyễn Đạo Học submitted our local offerings to the
Yuan king and thereby investigated their situation. Also it was the day
when the Yuan king allowed our envoy, L Anh, to return home.
In the meantime, a powerful staff of their headquarters was formed by
Kublai Khans order. In addition to To Huan, most of veteran generals of
Mongol armed forces, who had acquired military merit in annihilating the
Sung, were gathered. Among them were A Li Hai Ya, who had gained victory
in Hsiang Yang, Ngoh Chou, Pan Chng, Shng Kiang, Kiang Ling and many
other battlefields in China, and Li Hng, who had succeeded in the Yai
Shan operation, bringing the Sung Dynasty to an end; and several generals
and high-ranked officers who had ever cooperated with and received aid
from A Li Hai Ya such as Ao Lu Chih, Cheng Png Fei, Wu Ma Er, So Tu,
Pan Chieh, and so on. Otherwise stated, Kublai Khan had a powerful staff
of most talented and veteran officers in his hands.
In the 7th month of Chih Yuan 21 (1284) when To Huans troops were
halted at Ching Hu Chan Chng Hsin Shng, Emperor Nhn Tng ordered the
mission of Nguyễn Đạo Học to meet with him there. Thereafter, the latter
ordered Ch Lieh (Kl) and Ta Hai San Li (Taqai Sarq) to accompany
Nguyễn Đạo Học to our country with his letter, blaming and requesting our
emperor to provide supplies for Yuan army and receive To Huan from the
border into our country on their way to attack Champa. Just as To Huan
moved his troops to Hsin Shan District of Hu Nan, Ch Lieh and Ta Hai
San Li left Đại Việt, accompanied by the mission of Trần Đức Qun and Trần
Tự Tng who carried the emperors letter of refusing To Huans request
for taking the route of our country: Whether by land or by water,
traveling from my country to Champa is not convenient. Upon receiving the
letter, To Huan ordered Chao Tzŭ Chi to reply to Emperor Nhn Tng,
requesting him to open the road and supply provisions. He was, too,
informed at the same time that Trần Hưng Đạo had deployed troops to the
border.
In An Nan Chuan of Yuan Shih 209, p.5b11, all of these facts are said
to have occurred in the 2nd month of Chih Yuan 22 (1285) since, according
to Pen Chi of Yuan Shih 13 p.6a5, To Huans troops marched into our
country in the 12th month of Chih Yuan 21. It is more carefully recorded
in An Nam Chi Luoc 4, p.53: On the 21st of the 12th month the army
reached the borderland of An Nam. This is quite in accordance with the
account in Ching Shih Ta Tien Tzŭ Lu of Yuan Wen Lei 41, p.27a2-3: In the
10th month of [Chih Yuan] 21, [our] troops reached Yung Chou. The An Nam
[king] ordered Hưng Đạo Vương to dispatch 20,000 men to their posts to
halt [our] kings troops. In the 12th month, they were defeated at the
frontier pass Khả Ly.
Thus, it must be in the 10th month of Chih Yuan 21 (1284) that To Huan
and his troops reached Yung Chou of Hu Nan. There, A Li Hai Ya ordered
Chao Tzŭ Chi to write a letter, requesting our emperor to open the road
and prepare supplies to receive Chn Nan Wang, as recorded in An Nan
Chuan of Yuan Shih 209, p.6a5-6. Also in the words of An Nan Chuan of Yuan
Shih 209, p.6a6-7, upon reaching Yung Chou of Kwang Hsi, To Huan learned
that the Đại Việt General Điện Tiền Phạm Hải Nham had deployed troops at
Khả Lan, Vi Đại Trợ. When the formers army reached Szu Ming of Kwang
Chou, he sent a letter to Emperor Nhn Tng, repeating the same demands
set forth in A Li Hai Yas letter. Thereafter, he went on to move his
troops into Lộc Chu of our country, that is, Lộc Bnh District in what is
now Lạng Sơn Province.
There, having heard that Emperor Nhn Tng had dispatched troops to the
positions at the frontier passes Khu n and Khu Cấp Lnh, To Huan
divided his troops into two wings. According to An Nam Ch Lược 4 p.53,
this took place on the 21st, Gip T, of the 12th month of Gip Thn (i.e.
January 27th, 1285); the west wing commanded by Wan Hu Po Lo Ho Ta Er
(Bolqadar) ( Authors note: transliterated in An Nam Ch Lựơc as Wan Hu Li
Lo Ho Ta Er. [From here on, all the footnotes by the author are marked
with LMT in brackets.]) and A Shn (Atsin) advanced down via Khu n
whereas the east wing commanded by San Ta Er Tai (Tatartai) and Wan Hu Li
Ping Hsien via Cấp Lnh.
Even at that time, Emperor Nhn Tng kept on sending a letter to To
Huan, carried by Thiện Trung Đại Phu Nguyễn Đức Dư and Triều Thỉnh Lang
Nguyễn Văn Hn, demanding his armys withdrawal with the emperors
reference to an edict issued by Kublai Khan in 1261: ordering our [Yuan]
troops not to enter your [An Nam] territory, as recorded in An Nan Chuan
of Yuan Shih 209, p.6a9-10. A Li Hai Ya detained Nguyễn Văn Hn but
allowed Nguyễn Đức Dư to return with A Li, who carried a letter from him
replying to the emperors request for their withdrawal: the reason we
launch the campaign is [to punish] Champa, not An Nam. Nevertheless, A Li
could not approach our court since on his arrival at Cấp Bảo District he
encountered our troops commanded by Quản Qun Nguyễn Lộc, and then more
troops deployed by Trần Hưng Đạo in L Village, Đoản District, and Vạn
Kiếp. Being informed of this, A Li Hai Ya ordered I Jun to investigate the
situation of our troops to prepare his attack. Shortly thereafter, he was
reported by San Ta Er Tai, Liu Ping Hsien and Tsun Yu that they had
encountered our troops counterattacks at the frontier pass Khả Ly. The
fact above is taken from An Nan Chuan of Yuan Shih 209 p.6a3-b2.
The Battle of Nội Bng
In this battle, Tsun Yu captured our two officers, Quản Qun Phụng Ngự
Đỗ Vĩ and Đỗ Hựu, and had them killed later. Then he advanced to Động Bng
where Yuan troops had fought with our troops and killed our general Tần
Sm. Afterwards they moved to Biến Tr Village for a halt. According to
ĐVSKTT, on the 26th of the 12th month the enemys forces attacked the
frontier passes at Vĩnh Chu, Nội Bng, Thiết Lược, and Chi Lăng. Thus,
after five days advance from Lộc Chu, the west wing of Po Lo Ho Ta Er
together with To Huans great army completely broke through our line of
defense, chiefly formed to protect Thăng Long, by crossing our frontier
passes in the north down to our plains in the south. According to An Nan
Chuan of Yuan Shih 209 p.6b5, to besiege and attack the frontier pass Nội
Bng, To Huans troops were divided into six directions. In the words of
Pen Chi of Yuan Shih 13, p.6a5-6: That month, Chn Nan Wangs troops
marched into An Nan, killing [their] frontier troops and advancing in six
directions. Hưng Đạo Vương of An Nam commanded his troops to
counterattack.
Accordingly, it may be said that this is a great battle, if not a
strategically decisive battle. For, on our part, the troops commanded by
Quốc Cng Tiết Chế Trần Hưng Đạo had suffered a heavy loss with Đại Liu
Ban Đon Thai captured alive. Later, as it will be seen below, Emperor
Nhn Tng ordered Trần Hưng Đạo to mobilize troops from other Routes, of
which troops of princes and Trần Hưng Đạos son mounted to nearly 200,000.
Further, the fact that Trần Hưng Đạo had withdrawn his troops urgently and
suddenly shows that the sudden defeat on the Noi Bang front seemed to be
beyond his own planning.
In ĐVSKTT 5, p.45a4-b1, the withdrawal of our troops is described
rather graphically with the detail of Tỳ Tướng Yết Kius waiting for Trần
Hưng Đạo at Bi Tn: Earlier, Hưng Đạo Vương had two servants called D
Tượng and Yết Kiu, who were very well treated by him. When the Yuan
troops came, Yết Kiu posted boats at Bi Tn whereas D Tượng followed
Trần Hưng Đạo. When our troops were defeated, all boats were scattered.
[Hưng Đạo] Vương was about to retreat along the way in the foothills when
D Tượng said, if he does not see you yet, surely Yết Kiu will not move
his boats to anywhere else. [Hưng Đạo] Vương followed him to Bi Tn,
where remained Yết Kius boats alone. So pleased, Vương said, It is due
to its six strong bones supporting wings that the Great Bird can fly high.
Without them, it remains merely an ordinary bird. After these words, he
had his boats handled away from the enemys pursuit. Reaching Vạn Kiếp, he
deployed troops to defend Bắc Giang. This shows clearly that the front of
Nội Bng was broken in an extremely unfavorable situation, even seemingly
unexpected not only to the direct commander, Trần Hưng Đạo, but also to
Emperor Nhn Tng, the leader and the commander-in-chief of our war of
resistance at that time.
This situation may be seen through the fact that Emperor Nhn Tng,
being informed of the fighting at Nội Bng, gave up his breakfast, taking
boat all day toward Hải Đng to confer with Trần Hưng Đạo, as recorded in
ĐVSKTT: Then the king was seated in a light boat, traveling to the Route
of Hải Đng. It was, then, nearly at twilight but the king had not had his
breakfast yet. A common soldier brought a meal with rice of bad quality
for him. The king praised him to be loyal, giving him the title of
superior rank and the position of Tiểu Tư at the local community of Hữu
Triều Mn in Bạch Đằng. Obviously, the fact that Emperor Nhn Tng gave
up his breakfast to hurry to Hải Đng by boat shows that the front there
played a very important role in the strategy of defense of the Trần
Dynasty at that time.
It may be said that through the fact above Emperor Nhn Tng and Trần
Hưng Đạos primary plan of fighting seemed to dispatch troops of defense
to the positions right on the frontier of our country, a plan quite in
accordance with the tactics L Thường Kiệt had applied more than 200 years
earlier. Indeed, the defeat on the Nội Bng front required that Emperor
Nhn Tng and Trần Hưng Đạo should have a new strategy in place of the old
ones in facing the enemy. This must have been the reason why the emperor
himself had to confer with Trần Hưng Đạo so urgently in Hải Đng.
What Emperor Nhn Tng and Trần Hưng Đạo discussed in this brief
conference is not known today; yet, in the words of ĐVSKTT 5 pp.44b7-45a4,
following their discussion Hưng Đạo Vương was ordered to mobilize troops
and militiamen of the Routes in Hải Đng, selecting strong men as
volunteers for crossing the sea down to the south. The situation of our
army became rather favorable. Hearing of this, our troops gathered from
everywhere. The king wrote a poem on his bows:
The former event of Cối K you should remember;
In Hoan i remain one hundred thousand of troops.
Under Trần Hưng Đạos command, Hưng Vũ Vương Nghiễn, Minh Hiến Vương
Uất, Hưng Nhượng Vương Tảng, Hưng Tr Vương Hiện concentrated troops from
Bằng H, Na Sầm, Tr Hương, Yn Sinh, Long Nh, totally 200.000 men, then
moving to Vạn Kiếp to fight against the Yuan army. Thus, there
really occurred some change in our armys strategic measures that would
then be manifested in Emperor Nhn Tngs art of leading the war. Today,
this measure is generally designated by military theorists as strategic
withdrawal and strategic counterattack. The urgent conference between
Emperor Nhn Tng and Trần Hưng Đạo shortly after our defeat on the front
of Nội Bng points out some brilliant reflection in the military aspect
not only of Trần Hưng Đạo but also of Emperor Nhn Tng, who was acting as
the commander-in-chief of our armed forces at that time. That Emperor Nhn
Tng suffered hunger all day to reach Trần Hưng Đạos position for
conference shows how perilous the situation of our country was then.
Further, it points out how closely and seriously the emperor observed the
situation of our armys fighting so as to resolve on the spot whatsoever
problems created by complicated and dangerous changes in various
situations. That he mobilized troops from the Routes, the princes and the
nobles to Vạn Kiếp was a typical fact. The two lines of verse mentioned
above indicated that Emperor Nhn Tng was unceasingly seeking to lend
encouragement to Trần Hưng Đạo and other generals. The former event of
Cối K refers to a historical fact in the old days when Kou Chien, head
of the Yeh state, was defeated and captured by Fou Tsai, head of the Wu
state, but the former, having suffered a great deal of hardship and
humility, eventually rose to gain a victory over the latter. It should be
noticed that the defeat on the Nội Bng front was such a great loss to our
army that Emperor-Father Trần Thnh Tng ever asked Trần Quốc Tuấn, the
general who was directly commanding our troops on the front, whether our
army should surrender in such a situation; and the talented strategist
replied: Your Majesty should first cut my head and then surrender, as in
the words of ĐVSKTT 6 p.11b. The figure 200,000 men, however, shows that
the force of our army remained perfectly preserved. With such a strong
army, in addition to his unceasing attempt to maintain the officers
morale in terms of the former event of Cối K, Emperor Nhn Tng kept on
encouraging them through his announcement that one hundred thousand men
were being concentrated in Hoan i for reinforcement. Indeed, according to
An Nan Chuan of Yuan Shih 209 p.6b6, after the battle of Nội Bng the
enemy admitted Hưng Đạo Vương was commanding more than 1000 warships
deployed ten miles far from Vạn Kiếp.
The Battle of Vạn Kiếp
To Huans attack on Nội Bng on the 26th of the 12th month of Gip
Thn, which is dated the 27th in An Nam Ch Lược, must have lasted for
several days. Thus, the year of Gip Thn was coming to an end; that is to
say, the greatest festival of the year was waiting for the whole people of
Đại Việt. Yet, all that they were preparing for the longest and most
exiting holidays of the year was weapons, provisions and, above all, their
unyielding spirit. The battle of Nội Bng ended and Trần Hưng Đạo
retreated into Vạn Kiếp, concentrating troops from the Routes to prepare
for the coming battle. ĐVSKTT 5 p.45b2-3 says: On the 6th of the 1st
month of Ất Dậu, i.e. the spring of Thiệu Bảo the Seventh (1285), Wu Ma Er
of the Yuan army attacked Vạn Kiếp and Mount Phả Lại. Hưng Đạo Vương of An
Nam, who was commanding troops of defense in Vạn Kiếp, fought against him.
Wan Hu I Jun was killed at Lưu Thn.
According to An Nan Chuan of Yuan Shih 209 p.6b6-7, To Huan had built
factories for making warships and organized naval troops, who were
commanded by Wu Ma Er to launch a major attack on Vạn Kiếp. On their way
of advance, they picked Emperor Nhn Tngs two letters sent to To Huan
and A Li Hai Ya with respect to his request that they should observe
Kublai Khans order issued in the year of Chung Tung 2 (1261) and that
they had to withdraw their troops. Afterwards, A Li Hai Ya wrote a letter
to Emperor Nhn Tng, requesting him to open the road for the troops of
the [Yuan} court to fight Champa. The letter was carried to Vạn Kiếp by
our detained messenger, Nguyễn Văn Hn, who had just been released by the
Yuan army.
Even at that moment A Li Hai Ya went on with his impudent words as
recorded in An Nan Chuan of Yuan Shih 209, pp.6b11-7a3: Leading troops to
fight Champa, the [Yuan] court has repeatedly sent letters to you, asking
for opening the road and preparing supplies. It is sufficiently surprising
that you have opposed the order from the court, letting Hưng Đạo Vương
command troops to fight against and cause losses for our army. To let the
people of An Nam suffer disasters, it is your countrys fault. Now, the
Great Army is crossing your country to fight Champa. His Majesty gives
orders for you to think seriously. Your country has long been subject [to
the imperial court]; you should think of His Majestys great mercy to open
the road immediately and advise the people to make their living as before.
When our troops pass by, there will not be anything harmful. You should go
out receiving Chn Nan Wang, discussing military affairs with him.
Otherwise, the Great Army will be quartered and establish their bases in
An Nam.
On the part of Đại Việt, as has been mentioned above, Emperor Nhn Tng
and Trần Hưng Đạo ordered troops from the Routes in the northeast such as
Hải Đng, Vn Tr, Ba Điểm, and other places, Bng H, Na Sầm, Tr Hương,
Yn Sinh, Long Nhn to be concentrated at Vạn Kiếp and Mount Phả Lại.
According to Section Sơn Xuyn of An Nam Ch Nguyn 1 p.42, Mount Phả
Lại is situated in Từ Sơn District, facing Bnh Than, embraced on the
left by the Như Nguyệt River and on the right by the Cch. It is a
magnificent landscape of the region. Concerning Emperor Nhn Tng, he
himself commanded the Thnh Dực army of more than 1000 men to help Trần
Hưng Đạo counterattack, as recorded in An Nan Chuan of Yuan Shih 209,
p.7a3-4.
Thus, according to Pen chi of Yuan Shih, by the festival of Ất Dậu New
Year Wu Ma Er had ordered a decisive blow on our base in Vạn Kiếp, where a
fierce battle occurred with the death of the Yuan General Wan Hu I Jun at
Lưu Thn. This is in accordance with an account in An Nan Chuan of Yuan
Shih 209 p.6b5-6, where it says: Hưng Đạo Vương fled; [our] mandarins and
men pursued him to Vạn kiếp, attacking and destroying [their hold at] the
frontier pass.
The Battle of Bnh Than
According to An Nam Ch Lược 4 p.54, on the 9th, Nham Ngo, of the 1st
month Emperor Nhn Tng commanded 100,000 troops in a great battle at Bi
Than. Yuan Shuai Wu Ma Er, Na Hai (Naqai), and Tsun Lin T destroyed all
the boats they had captured before. Concerning the same day Pen Chi of
Yuan Shih 13 p.7a8-9 says: Wu Ma Er with his troops encountered Hưng Đạo
Vươngs troops of An Nam and defeated them, without mentioning the place.
Accordingly, in the fighting at Bi Than commanded by Emperor Nhn Tng
there were surely one thousand warships Trần Hưng Đạo had deployed about
ten miles from Vạn Kiếp as recorded above by Yuan Shih.
Here, Bi Than is nothing other than Bnh Than because in a passage on
the Bnh Than River An Nam Ch Nguyn 1, pp.46-47, says: [The river]
named Bi Than or Bnh Than is in Ch Linh District. It flows from Xương
Giang to [its confluence with] the Thị Cầu River, where they incorporate
into each other to flow between Mount Ch Linh and Mount Phả Lại, winding
so vastly that it is hard to see its border. At the mouth of the Đỗ Mộ
River, it is divided into two branches flowing into the sea. In this
quotation, Bi Than is transliterated according to Manuscript B cited by
Gaspardone in Kao I on page 47. (E. Gaspardone, Ngan-nan Tche Yuan, Hanoi:
Imprimarie dExtreme-Orient, 1932, p.47. [LMT])
The Battle of Thăng Long
Following the battles at Vạn Kiếp, Phả Lại and Bnh Than, the enemy
went on to attack Vũ Ninh and Đng Ngạn and then advanced down to Gia Lm.
Meanwhile, our troops were compelled to retreat into Thăng Long along the
Thin Đức River, where occurred some small combats. In the words of ĐVSKTT
5 p.45b3-5: On the 12th day the enemy attacked Gia Lm, Vũ Ninh, Đng
Ngạn. Seeing the two words st tht (殺 韃, killing the Tatars ( 韃 靼 ), a
designation of the Mongols by the Vietnamese at that time.) inscribed on
the arms of our troops they had captured, they got so angry that they
killed a large number of them. Then they advanced into Đng Bộ Đầu and
erected their big flag there. [Our] King wanted to be informed precisely
of the enemys situation but he did not yet know who could undertake it.
Realizing his intention, Chi Hầu Cục Thủ Đỗ Khắc Chung stepped forward,
saying: Though humble and untalented, I would like to go. The King was
very pleased, saying: No one dares to say that among the horses pulling
carts of salt there would not be any swift and excellent ones. Then Chung
left, taking the letter with him.
In Yuan Shih 13 p.7a9, the day cited above is dated Ất Dậu, when An
Nam Thế Tử Trần Nhật Huyn commanded more than 1000 warships to
counterattack. On the day Bnh Tuất, [our army] fought with [An Nam]
troops and destroyed them totally. Nhật Huyn ran away. [Our army] marched
into his citadel and then went out, quartered north of the Ph Lương
River. In the words of An Nam Ch Lược 54: On the 13th day, Bnh Tuất,
Thế Tử held [the position on] the L River but soon left because it was
broken. Chn Nan Wangs troops crossed the river, entering the citadel and
holding a party there. The same is recorded in Ching Shih Ta Tien Tzŭ Lu
in Yuan Wen Lei 41, p.27a4-56: Mandarins and troops reached the Ph Lương
River. Nhật Huyn himself fought against them. Defeated, he left his
citadel for the Thin Trường Prefecture. Mandarins and troops entered the
capital. In An Nan Chuan of Yuan Shih 209, p.7a4, the battle is very
clearly described: Accompanied by the mandarins of Hsin Shng, Chn Nan
Wang himself reached Đng Ngạn to command troops to fight the [An Nam]
troops. [We] killed a large number of men and captured twenty boats. Hưng
Đạo Vương was defeated and ran away. Mandarins and troops built a bridge
of connected rafts to land on the north bank of the Ph Lương River. There
had existed their troops and boats and wood barriers along the river.
Seeing [our] mandarins and troops, they fired cannons, shouted loudly and
challenged to fight. In the afternoon, Nguyễn Phụng Ngự was ordered to
carry a letter to Chn Nan Wang and the official of Hsin Shng, asking for
our great armys withdrawal. The official of Hsin Shng wrote a letter of
blame and then ordered troops to advance. Nhật Huyn fled out of the
capital, but soon ordered Nguyễn Hiệu Nhuệ to come with his letter of
excuse and some local gifts, asking for [our] withdrawal. The official of
Hsin Shng sent him a letter, persuading the [An Nan] army to surrender.
Then he commanded troops to cross the river and halted near the An Nan
capital. The following day, Chn Nan Wang entered their capital. The
palaces were deserted; there remained some decrees and some letters from
our Hsin Shng, all being torn into pieces.
From the account above, we may acquire some significant remarks. First,
though it was a great battle on water in which was involved an army of
more than 100,000 men, the battle of Bnh Than in essence was really of a
mobile warfare, that is, fighting for retreating and attracting the
enemy into trap. Accordingly, when To Huan ordered his troops to connect
rafts to make a bridge across the Thiện Đức River, now known as the Đuống
River, on their way toward the Ph Lương River, i.e. the Red River,
Emperor Nhn Tng once again ordered to fire cannons, shout loudly and
challenge to fight when he was personally commanding troops in the battle
of Thăng Long.
Secondly, though challenging the enemy to fight, Emperor Nhn Tng kept
on establishing some corridor of relationship with the enemy for the
purpose of carrying out his tactical intention and fathoming the enemys
situation. In Yuan Shih, the people having such names as Nguyễn Phụng Ngự
and Nguyễn Hiệu Nhuệ are said to have carried Emperor Nhn Tngs letters
to To Huan but in reality they are not found in our history books.
Instead, in ĐVSKTT 5 only the name Đỗ Khắc Chung is mentioned. Thirdly,
the reason Emperor Nhn Tng could have such an active relationship with
the enemy is that he had been capable of maintaining his entire armed
forces after the battle of Bnh Than. Thereafter, he concentrated all
troops in Thăng long to prepare for a strategic retreat into Thin Trường,
where he could defend our people against the enemys attack in three
directions, that is, the armies commanded by To Huan and A Li Hai Ya in
the north-east, by Na Su La Ting (Nasir ud Din) in the north-west, and
particularly by So Tu in the south.
It was on the 14th of the 1st month of Ất Dậu (1285), when To Huan
entered our citadel to hold a party with his staff and then retreated to
halt north of the Red River, that So Tu, Tang Wu Tai (Tangutai) moved
their troops to join with Chn Nan Wang, as recorded in Pen Chi of Yuan
Shih 13, p.7a10-11. Tang Wu Tai was the general whom To Huan, when
commanding troops to advance, ordered to go to Champa with the task of
telling So Tu to retreat his troops for a concentration of fighting
forces, as recorded in An Nan Chuan of Yuan Shih 209, p.5b12-13: ordering
Tso Chng Tang Wu Tai to go to Champa by post-horses, informing So Tu of
the date of concentrating all the armed forces. In reality, as it will be
seen later, So Tus troops could not move to the position of concentration
in time; and only the major army commanded by To Huan could gather in
Thăng Long to suffer the thundering counteroffensives by the troops and
militiamen of Đại Việt in the triumphant victories in Chương Dương, Ty
Kết, Hm Tử.
Before the above-mentioned victories of our country over the Yuan army,
To Huan, in his headquarters in Thăng Long, on the one hand, ordered Wan
Hu Li Ping Hsien and Liu Shih Ying to command troops to open a route from
Yung Ping into An Nam. Along the route within each 30 miles they set up a
camp and within each 60 miles a station, where 300 men were regularly
posted to hold and patrol. He also ordered Shih Ying to establish posts to
handle camps and stations, as recorded in An Nan Chuan of Yuan Shih 209,
p.7b7-9. It was one of their measures to secure the areas occupied by them
but frequently harassed by our troops.
On the other hand, also in the words of An Nan Chuan of Yuan Shih 209
p.7b9-10, To Huan ordered Yu Chng Kuan Ch (Knčk) to command Wan Hu
Mang Ku Tai (Manquadai) and Po Lo Ho Ta Er by land and Li Tso Chng to
command Wu Ma Er Pa Tu (Omar baatur) by water to pursue our troops
withdrawal and and attack our positions along the Red River and the troops
who were holding Thin Trường south of Thăng Long. Thus, it was on the
bank of Thin Mạc that the first battle broke out.
The Battle of Đ Mạc
Đ Mạc or Thin Mạc, which was later named Mạn Tr, is a bank of land
along the Red River in what is now Hưng Yn Province. Khm Định Việt Sử
Thng Gim Cương Mục 6 p.42a3-4 says: The Thin Mạc River is the lower
Ph Lương at Bank Mạn Tr in Đng Yn District of Hưng Yn Province.
There, our army set up a stronghold commanded by Trần Bnh Trọng.
According to An Nam Ch Lược 4 p.54, On the 21st, Nhm Thn, [the Yuan
troops] swept through the Thin Hn frontier pass, cutting down General
Bảo Nghĩa Hầu. In reality, the Nhm Thn day of the 1st month of Ất Dậu
must be the 19th and not the 21st. Certainly the number 19 was mistaken
for 21 because they are very easy to be falsely copied. Regarding the name
Thin Hn, obviously the character Hn (漢) is the mistaken form of the
character Mạc (漠) because they are of rather similar forms.
In An Nan Chuan of Yuan Shih 209, p.7b10, the date of the battle is not
mentioned but it has an account of the battle and the capture of Kiến Đức
Hầu
Trần Trọng by the Yuan army. In Ching Shih Ta Tien Tzŭ Lu of Yuan Wen
Lei 41, p.27a6-7, the fact Trần Trọng was captured is, too, recorded but
dated after the battles of A Lỗ and Thin Trường and before Emperor Nhn
Tngs retreat to the mouth of Giao Thủy. Among them, the information
taken from An Nam Ch Lược is relatively correct because L Sực wrote down
what he could more or less participate and know. Trần Trọng, here, must be
the national hero Trần Bnh Trọng in ĐVSKTT. A single difference is that
his title was Bảo Nghĩa Hầu instead of Kiến Đức Hầu as recorded in Chinese
accounts. The title Kiến Đức Hầu might have been given to Trần Bnh Trọng
when he was alive whereas Bảo Nghĩa Hầu was his posthumous title,
conferred on him to praise a generals bravery and consistency in the face
of the enemys persuasion, which is clearly discussed below in ĐVSKTT.
That An Nam Ch Lược 4 p.54 has a different account concerning the fact
above from that in Yuan Shih originates from the fact that L Sực, who was
then working with Chương Hiến Hầu Trần Kiện in Vietnam when Trần Bnh
Trọng was killed and then given the title, could know very clearly the
latters change of title.
On the part of Yuan troops, their commander of this battle is nowhere
mentioned. Yet, in Vietnamese history books a hero of ours in this battle
was clearly recorded. In the words of ĐVSKTT: Bảo Nghĩa Vương Trần Bnh
Trọng (who, a descendant of L Đại Hnh, was the later husband of Princess
Thụy Bảo and whose father, an official under Thi Tngs reign, was given
the national surname Trần) died on behalf of his fighting against the
enemy on the bank of Đ Mạc (namely, Thin Mạc, present-day Mạn Tr). When
captured, he refused eating. When asked by the enemy about our national
affairs, he refused answering. Asked Would you like to work as a vương
(The highest of titles conferred on a subject of the Imperial Court.) in
the Northern Land?, he shouted loudly, I would rather become a demon in
the Southern Country than a vương in the Northern Land. Thereafter, he
was killed.
The fundamental difference is that in ĐVSKTT the battle of Đ Mạc and
Trần Bnh Trọngs heroic death are dated the 2nd month of Ất Dậu, that is,
after the surrenders of Chương Kiến Hầu Trần Kiện and L Sực, whereas
according to L Sực himself it is the Nhm Thn day of the 1st month of Ất
Dậu. In this case, L Sựcs information appears to be more reliable if it
is based on the course of military situation at that time. Further, he was
contemporary with Trần Bnh Trọng and directly joined in some military
activities at that time. Another reason is that it was not really
necessary for him to change the date of the Yuan attack on our base at Đ
Mạc.
Finally, as it has been said before, that Trần Bnh Trọngs death
occurred a little before L Sựcs surrender, approximately more or less
than a month, surely had a great impact on the latter. Indeed, according
to Khm Định Việt Sử Thng Gim Cương Mục 7 p.36b2, on hearing of Trần
Bnh Trọngs death Emperor Nhn Tng cried so sorrowfully. This points out
that the death of Trần Bnh Trọng exerted a strong impact on the leading
group of our country at that time. The title Bảo Nghĩa Hầu might have been
conferred by Emperor Nhn Tng for the purpose of praising the unyielding
spirit of a hero in a period when the emperor realized that there began to
appear around him those who could not maintain some mutual affection
between king and subjects, some loyalty to king and nation so that they
might be ready to defect to the enemy at any time.
Moreover, concerning the battle of Đ Mạc what is mentioned in ĐVSKTT
was chiefly cited from Đại Việt Sử K Tục Bin of Phan Phu Tin, who could
not have such favorable conditions as other historians when he was writing
his own book. For that was the time when our country was dominated by the
Ming for nearly twenty years and underwent many intense wars of liberation
led by our patriots such as Trần Trng Quang, Nguyễn Biểu, Phạm Ngọc, L
Lợi. Most of historical materials, therefore, must have been confiscated
or destroyed by the enemy, especially those recorded by Quốc Sử Qun of
the Trần Dynasty, which we, today, cannot know exactly whether to have
been hidden according to Hồ Qu Lys plan or not. The most typical example
is that the two wars of 1285 and 1288 were really the great wars of
defense but they are described very plainly in ĐVSKTT, let alone some
points to be found completely false. For that reason it might not be
surprising for readers at all to face the above-mentioned differences.
In summary, the battle of Đ Mạc was not actually great. Yet, through
it we can see not only the heroic, unyielding character of the commander
Trần Bnh Trọng but also our peoples resolution of defeating the enemy in
a most difficult period of our country. It was due to such courageous and
strenuous people that the later victories in the battles of Hm Tử, Chương
Dương, Ty Kết, etc. could be gained.
The battle of A Lỗ
According to An Nam Ch Lược 4 p.54, subsequent to the battle of Đ
Mạc, in which Kiến Đức Hầu Trần Trọng was captured, Thế Tử withdrew his
troops to defend the frontier pass Hải Thị, ordering to set up poles for
building a dam of defense on the west bank. Mandarins and troops stormed
them with intersecting arrows shot from both above and below; they were
broken down completely. Ching Shih Ta Tien Tzŭ Lu in Yuan Wen Lei 41,
p.27a6, says: [Our] Great Army pursued Nhật Huyn on the rivers of A Lỗ
and Đức Cương. Based on these two reports, the names Hải Thị and A Lỗ
obviously refer to the same place. Particularly in the words of An Nan
Chih Yuan 1 p.47: The Hải Triều River in Khoi Chu is a tributary of the
H Lỗ River; its upper stream is connected with the Ngọc Chu River.
Here, H Lỗ is no doubt the A Lỗ River just mentioned in Ching Shih Ta
Tien Tzŭ Lu. Concerning Khoi Chu, it was located in present-day Hưng Yn
Province. And Đ Mạc, i.e. Thin Mạc, is said in Khm Định Việt Sử Thng
Gim Cương Mục 6, p.42a3-4, to be situated on the lower Red River in Hưng
Yn Province. Thus, the two bases of Đ Mạc and A Lỗ were close to each
other. This might be the group of bases established for defending Thin
Trường.
With the detail intersecting arrows shot from both above and below,
it is evident that the enemys two-pronged attack, on land and on water,
commanded by Kuan Ch and Li Hng was aimed at pursuing the great army
of Emperor Nhn Tng and storming into our base at A Lỗ after occupying Đ
Mạc. Once more, it was a battle that caused great loss for the enemy and
drew them into the trap planned beforehand in our armys tactics.
The Battle of Đại Hong
According to An Nam Ch Lược 4 p.54, following their victory at A Lỗ,
on the 3rd, Đinh Tỵ, of the 2nd month, Chn Nan Wang broke Thế Tửs
troops on the Đại Hong River. It was the first time To Huan appeared in
the area near Thin Trường. The Đại Hong River, according to An Nam Ch
Nguyn 1 p.42, is located in L Nhn Prefecture, where its upper stream
is connected with the L River, its lower stream with the GiaoThủy or
Phụng Ha Prefecture. In Khm Định Việt Sử Thng Gim Cương Mục, a note
on Hong Giang says: The Hong River is in Nam Xương District, its
upper stream connected with the Thin Mạc River, its lower stream with the
Giao Thủy River. Thus, due to its connection with Thin Mạc, Đại Hong or
Hong Giang is one in a series of positions south of Thăng Long
established to defend Thin Trường.
The battle that occurred there must have been extremely intense; for
To Huan himself moved his great army down from Thăng Long to pursue our
troops, who had also been concentrated at Đại Hong and commanded not only
by Emperor Nhn Tng but also by other generals such as Trần Hưng Đạo,
Trần Quang Khải. On the part of our army, however, it was not really a
counteroffensive but an enemy-exhausting combat for the purpose of keeping
our troops withdrawal safe.
The Military Situation in Thăng Long after Our Armys Withdrawal
The battles of A Lỗ and Đại Hong are not mentioned in ĐVSKTT, but
concerning the battle of Đ Mạc ĐVSKTT 5 p.47a5-6 says: The enemys
forces were so violent that the two kings (Emperor Nhn Tng and his
Emperor-father Thnh Tng.) had to retreat into Tam Trĩ Nguyn in a small
ship, ordering to drive it to Ngọc Sơn to deceive the enemy. In reality,
our troops in that situation were not so demoralized and the two kings not
so isolated that they had to have such seemingly frightened actions. Yuan
Shih 13 p.8b8-10 says: On the Bnh T day of the 3rd month, Hu Nan Chan
Chng Hsin Shng requested for more men. Then, Trần Nhật Huyn had fled
to Thin Trường and Trường Yn, ordering his troops to be concentrated
again. Hưng Đạo Vương gathered more than one thousand warships at Vạn Kiếp
whereas Nguyễn Lộcs troops were deployed at Vĩnh Bnh. In the meantime,
due to the long march of fighting for a long time, our mandarins and
troops, who were like being loosely hung between them, had to ask for
more men since the troops of So Tu and Tang Wu Tai could not come in
time. The reinforcement, by order of King, had to move by land since it
would not be safe to move by water.
Accordingly, after Emperor Nhn Tng withdrew from Thăng Long and
ordered troops to be concentrated at Thin Trường and Trường Yn, the
enemy fell into a very difficult situation. They themselves professed that
they were being loosely hung in a thick net with which the troops of Đại
Việt would cover them at any time. In fact, the Đại Việt army was
developing their strategy of besieging and destroying these far-marching
troops from three directions. The north wing was commanded by General
Nguyễn Lộc and had great contributions to a battle that could break the
hearts of those who were attempting to rob and sell our country as it
will be seen below. The east wing was composed of warships deployed by
Trần Hưng Đạo himself at Vạn Kiếp to stop the enemys eastward retreat.
The third wing, consisting of the entire armed forces, was concentrated at
Thin Trường and Trường Yn, now known as Nam Định and Ninh Bnh
respectively, and commanded directly by Emperor Nhn Tng and his
emperor-father Thnh Tng together with two famous generals, Trần Quang
Khải and Trần Nhật Duật. It was the major front with complicated
occurrences on our part as well as on the enemys.
Trần Kiện, Trần T Vin, and Trần Văn Lộng Surrendering
On the enemys part, So Tu was urgently withdrawing his troops from
Champa to the north by the order of To Huan transmitted by Tang Wu Tai.
On their way of retreat, there would be fierce combats with our troops as
it will be seen below. On our part, subsequent to the battles and then
withdrawals from Thăng Long and other bases at Đ Mạc, A Lỗ and Đại Hong,
some of the political and military leaders of Đại Việt at that time began
to show extremely puzzled, seemingly losing their confidence in the
nations potential strength and the brilliant leadership of Emperor Nhn
Tng together with Emperor-Father Thnh Tng and such generals as Trần
Hưng Đạo, Trần Quang Khải. Among those who sought to connect with the
enemy for their surrender, the earliest traitor was Trần Kiện with his
accomplices. ĐVSKTT 5 p.46b5-7 says: On the 1st, Gip Thn, of the 2nd
month [of Ất Dậu], Tnh Quốc Đại Vương Quốc Khangs elder son, Chương Hiến
Hầu named Kiệt, and L Sực took their families to surrender the Yuan army.
By So Tus order, they were brought to Yen Ching. At Camp Ma Lục, they
were stopped and attacked by Nguyễn Thế Lộc and Nguyễn Lĩnh, the natives
of Lạng Giang. Kiện was shot dead by a servant of Hưng Đạo Vươngs, Nguyễn
Địa L. L Sực escaped in the night, having Kiệns corpse carried on a
horse. After riding about ten miles, he reached Khu n and had Kiện
buried there.
The fact is more clearly described in An Nam Ch Lược 4, p.54: Thế Tử
ordered his younger brother, Chiu Văn Vương Trần Duật and Trịnh Đnh Ton
to command troops in Nghệ An. Being defeated, they all ran away. In such
an urgent situation, Thế Tử ordered his brothers son, Chương Hiến Hầu
Trần Kiện, to command the battlefield in Thanh Ha. After long resistance,
due to their weakness and lack of reinforcement, Chương Hiến and Sực
surrendered. Also in An Nam Ch Lược 13, pp.131-132: That winter (1284),
Chn Nan Wangs great army marched into the [An Nam] country, defeating
Thế Tử. Yu Chng So Tu, advancing from Champa, attacked them in the rear.
Extremely puzzled, Thế Tử had no other way than calling for Trần Kiện and
dispatching troops to him to fight against So Tu. Seeing that the troops
were weak and there were no reinforcement, and further, without any
information of whether Thế Tử was alive or not, Kiện sent for Sực, saying,
Due to Thế Tửs refusal of attending the audience, the war broke out. In
the face of danger, he is still not awakened. He would be pleased to see
our country lost and our houses broken, wouldnt he? In the 1st month of
the year that followed (1285), Kiện together with Sựcs group of about
some ten thousand people surrendered, handing in their weapons to Chn Nan
Wang.
Thus, Trần Kiệns surrender was a very complicated event. For it was
the first time when a descendant of the royal family, who was in charge of
a great army on an important front in Thanh Ha, surrendered the enemy. If
it was not promptly resolved, such a fact might have a highly perilous
impact, causing the collapse of the south front. As soon as he retreated
from Thăng long, Emperor Nhn Tng realized the importance of this front.
Right after the 15th of the 1st month of Ất Dậu (1285), therefore, he
urgently ordered Chiu Văn Vương Trần Nhật Duật to hold it.
According to An Nam Ch Lược 4 p.54 and Ching Shih Ta Tien Tzŭ Lu of
Yuan Wen Lei 41 p.27a5-6, by the end of the 1st month Ta Wang Chiao Chi,
Yu Chng So Tu, Tso Chng Tang Wu Tai, and Shan Chng Hei Ti, who just
retreated from Champa, penetrated into Bố Chnh Prefecture. Thereafter,
So Tu went on to advance to Nghệ An. Trần Nhật Duậts troops had to
retreat because he could not resist them. ĐVSKTT 5 p.46b4-5, therefore,
says: On the 26th, Hưng Đạo Vương asked [the King] for allowing Thượng
Tướng Thi Sư Trần Quang Khải to halt Yuan Shuai So Tu in Nghệ An. It
points out that shortly after Trần Nhật Duật urgently reported to our
supreme headquarters on his failure to resist the enemys forces, Emperor
Nhn Tng appointed Trần Quang Khải to assist him. It was in this period
that Trần Kiện was given the command of troops in Thanh Ha, where Kiện
led Sựcs group of ten thousand men with weapons to surrender Chn Nan
Wang according to An Nam Ch Lược 13 p.132.
The Battle of Ph Tn
Also in An Nam Ch Lược 4, p.54, on the day that followed, i.e. the
2nd, Ất Tỵ, of the 2nd month of Ất Dậu (1285), Chiao Chi commanded the
cavalry to cross the gate of Vệ Bố, liquidating troops of the Trần family
and killing some of their officers, that is, Đinh Xa and Nguyễn Tất
Thống. Then, also according to An Nam Ch Lược 3 p.54, on the 3rd day
when To Huan was attacking our base at Đại Hong and Emperor Nhn Tng
was retreating into Thin Trường, Trần T Vin and Trần Văn Lộng
surrendered to the Yuan. Four days later, that is, the 6th of the 2nd
month, as recorded in An Nam Ch Lược 4, p.54: on the 6th day, Kỷ Dậu,
Chiao Chi led Chang Hsien to attack the troops of Thế Tửs brother Trần
Khải at the Ph Tn ferry, cutting off a thousand [mens] heads. [Other
troops in] Thanh Ha, Nghệ An surrendered. This was the time when So Tus
troops could be united with To Huans as in the words of An Nan Chuan of
Yuan Shih 209 p.7b4-7: Tang Wu Tai together with So Tus troops from
Champa met with [To Huans] great army. Since they marched into Đại Việt,
they fought in seven battles, great and small, occupying more than two
thousand miles of land, four palaces of the [An Nam] king. Earlier they
had defeated the troops of Chiu Minh Vương. Chiu Hiếu Vương and Đại Liu
Hộ were killed. Chiu Minh Vương ran away, having no courage to appear
again. In addition, they captured Trần Thượng Thư, and the son-in-law of
Lương Phụng Ngự of Giao Chỉ together with Triệu Mạnh Tn, Diệp Lang Tướng
and more than four hundred descendants of the Sung family-in-exile in Nghệ
An, Diễn Chu, Thanh Ha, Trường Yn.
Accordingly, Trần Kiện had led Chiao Chi to attack the Ph Tn base
commanded by Thượng Tướng Trần Quang Khải with his son, Văn Tc Vương Đạo
Tải, and his nephew, Tả Thin Vương Đức Việp. Before Trần Quang Khải
retreated from the base, Chiu Hiếu Vương and Đại Liu Hộ were killed.
Thus, the fact that Trần Kiện surrendered to the enemy had a great
impact on our army. On the southern front such famous generals as Trần
Quang Khải, Trần Nhật Duật gradually withdrew from Thanh Ha and Nghệ Tĩnh
toward Thin Trường. After the battle of Đại Hong on the 3rd of the 2nd
month of Ất Dậu (1285) and the battle of Ph Tn on the 6th, Emperor Nhn
Tng together with Trần Hưng Đạo and Trần Quang Khải launched a strategic
withdrawal. Before his declaration of this withdrawal as a postponement of
military actions, Emperor Nhn Tng ordered Trung Hiếu Hầu Trần Dương and
Nguyễn Nhuệ to negotiate with To Huan and, at the same time, ordered his
servant, Đo Kin, to offer Princess An Tư to Chn Nan Wang for the
purpose of relieving the countrys disaster. Thereby, To Huan ordered
Chien Hu Ai to persuade Emperor Nhn Tng to attend the negotiation but
the latter refused, as recorded in An Nam Ch Lược 4, p.54. In ĐVSKTT 5,
p.47a1, the fact of offering Princess An Tư is mentioned but dated before
the battle of Đ Mạc.
The Strategic Retreat into Thanh Ha
Thus, after the battles of Đại Hong and Ph Tn the major armed forces
of Đại Việt, besides the units posted in regional stations, were first
concentrated in Thin Trường and then withdrawn strategically at the
river-mouth of Giao Thủy, as recorded in An Nan Chuan of Yuan Shih 209
p.7b10-11. Also it is said in Yuan Shih that the Yuan did not know where
our army moved. Then on page 7b11-12, it says: Some of Tngs relatives
such as Văn Nghĩa Hầu with his father Vũ Đạo Hầu, his son Minh Tr Hầu and
Seng Shan Chng, a mandarin of the Sung-in-exile, T Thiếu Bảos son named
T Bảo Chương, and Trần Thượng Thưs son named Trần Đnh Tn all
surrendered. Thus, the fact that Văn Nghĩa Hầu, i.e. Trần T Vin,
defected to the enemy occurred on the 3rd of the 3rd month of Ất Dậu
(1285) as recorded above by An Nam Ch Lược 4 p.54.
According to Yuan Shih 209 pp.7b13-8a3, it was these traitors that
supplied information for To Huan: Reaching the An Bang estuary, Nhật
Huyn gave up his ship, oars, armor, and cane to race into the mountains.
Mandarins and troops captured ten thousand ships, the good ones of which
were used, the remaining burned. Then, after three days pursuit on land,
our army captured alive some men, saying that the emperor-father [i.e.
Thnh Tng] and Thế Tử had only four ships left, Hưng Đạo Vương and his
son three ships, Thi Sư [Trần Nhật Duật] eighty ships, all moved to Thanh
Ha. Wu Ma Er Pa Tu commanded 1300 men and 60 ships to help So Tu pursue
Thi Sưs troops. Thus, this is obviously a withdrawal on a grand scale,
a strategic one carried out by Emperor Nhn Tng, his emperor-father, Trần
Hưng Đạo and Trần Quang Khải. When did the withdrawal take place then? An
Nam Ch Lược 4 p.54 says: On the 9th, Nhm Ngọ, of the 3rd month, on a
sea patrol with naval troops in Tam Trĩ, Chiao Chi and Tang Wu Tai
nearly captured Thế Tử. In the words of ĐVSKTT 5 p.47a5-6, however, the
withdrawal of Đại Việt troops into Tam Trĩ (i.e. the Ba Chẻ Mountains in
Quảng Ninh) took place toward the end of the 2nd month. Also according to
ĐVSKTT 5 p.47b4-5, on the 1st, Gip Tuất, of the 3rd month the two kings
left their ships and walked to Thủy Ch. There, they took ships along the
Nam Triệu River (i.e. Thủy Đường District), then crossed the Đại Bng sea
to Thanh Ha. Thus, the withdrawal certainly occurred before the 9th of
the 3rd month (or rather, the 10th day, Nhm Ngọ) and after the battle of
Ph Tn on the 6th of the same month.
Obviously, this strategic withdrawal was planned to avoid the
two-pronged thrust by To Huans troops from the north and by So Tus
troops which were penetrating into Thin Trường and Trường Yn from the
south. Thus, the great armies of To Huan and So Tu had been concentrated
in the plains of north Vietnam whereas our major forces were quartered
south of Thanh Ha, where Emperor Nhn Tng, Emperor-Father Thnh Tng and
generals Trần Hưng Đạo, Trần Quang Khải, Trần Nhật Duật, and so on would
launch a decisive counterattack to liberate the Thăng Long capital and the
whole country from the enemys occupation.
Trần ch Tắc Surrendering to the Yuan
According to An Nam Ch Lược 4 p.54, within the first ten days of the
3rd month of Ất Dậu when Emperor Nhn Tng and his headquarters were
carrying on the strategic withdrawal mentioned above, Chiu Quốc Vương
Trần ch Tắc and his group surrendered to the Yuan on the 15th, Mậu T.
In ĐVSKTT 5 p.47b5-7, the fact is dated later than the 1st of the 3rd
month: Chiu Quốc Vương ch Tắc together with Phạm Cự Địa, L Diễn, Trịnh
Long led their families to surrender to the Yuan. Later, Trần ch Tắc had
to suffer the tragic fate of a traitor, living hopelessly and, eventually,
ending his life in foreign soil, leaving a dirty name in our history books
forever. Meanwhile, our war of defense was reaching the decisive moments
and a glorious conclusion was waiting for well-known and unknown heroes
who were sacrificing themselves for their beloved Fatherland.
Đại Việt Armys Counteroffensives: the Victory at A Lỗ
After his strategic retreat into Thanh Ha, Emperor Nhn Tng must have
assembled all the troops to prepare for a great counterattack. In Chinese
historical accounts nothing is written about the remaining twenty days of
the same month, except that the traitors, Chương Hiến Hầu, Minh Thnh Hầu,
Nghĩa Quốc Hầu, etc. had been taken to China. ĐVSKTT 5 p.48a7-8 mentions a
remark by Emperor Nhn Tng on So Tus troops: Having moved so far for
years, the enemy must be exhausted; further, it is so hard for them to
transport supplies for miles. In our plan of taking advantage of relief
to fight against anxiety, if we can demoralize them in advance, we can
surely liquidate them. Emperor Nhn Tngs remark might have been set
forth in a summit of military strategists in Thanh Ha at that time. In
any case, it was the precious time for our army to prepare urgently for
the counterattack.
Concerning our counterattack, An Nam Ch Lược 4 p.54 records only one
sentence: In the summer, i.e. the 4th month, due to [our troops]
negligence, An Nam [troops] reoccupied La Thnh. It is also generally
mentioned in An Nan Chuan of Yuan Shih 209 p.8a7-9: The generals were
called to discuss the Giaos counteroffensives. Although our mandarins and
troops had defeated them many times, they collected more and more troops.
Outrunning their supplies, mandarins and troops suffered hardships, many
of them being killed in fighting. Troops and horses of the Mongols could
not perform their talent, too. Therefore, they had to give up the [An Nam]
capital, crossing the river toward the north side to discuss the plan of
withdrawal.
In the words of Ching Shih Ta Tien Tzŭ Lu in Yuan Wen Lei 41, p.27a8-9:
In the 4th month, all of Giao Chi troops pushed on. Their [general] Hưng
Đạo Vương attacked Wan Hu Liu Shih Ying at A Lỗ, Trung Thnh Vương
attacked Chien Hu Ma Jung in Giang Khẩu. They were killed and retreated.
Then, their army and naval forces besieged [our] command post thickly. A
great number of them were killed, but their reinforcements became more and
more crowded. Though having attempted to fight intensely all day,
mandarins and troops, due to lack of weapons, had to give up their
capital, crossing the river. It is then evidently clear that in the 4th
month the first attack of our army commanded by Trần Hưng Đạo was focused
on the base of A Lỗ, which our troops had left behind on the line of
defense at Thin Trường. The counterattack was successful and the enemys
general, Liu Shih Ying, had to abandon the base. It may be said that this
was the first victory of Đại Việts army and people after a series of
battles at A Lỗ, Đại Hong and Ph Tn in our tactics of retreating and
discouraging the enemy simultaneously. It is surprising enough that the
victory has not been recorded in our history books.
The First Battle of Ty Kết and the Victory at Hm Tử
According to ĐVSKTT 5 p.48a8-b6, In the summer, the 4th month, our
King ordered Chiu Thnh Vương (unnamed), Hoi Văn Hầu Quốc Toản, General
Nguyễn Khoi to lead troops to stop the enemy in Ty Kết. The courts army
fought with the Yuan troops in Hm Tử Quan. All the troops were
concentrated there. In Chiu Văn Vương Nhật Duậts army were some Sung men
dressed in Sung clothes, using bows and arrows. The emperor-father fearing
that they might be mistaken for the enemys troops ordered a servant to
tell our troops that They are the Mongol troops of Chiu Văn [Vương]. Be
careful [not to mistake them for the enemy]. For the Sung men and the
Yuan troops had rather similar speech and clothes. Seeing them, the Yuan
were frightened, saying, They are assisted by the Sung men and then ran
away toward the north. Earlier, when the Sung was exterminated [in China],
some Sung men turned to our court. They were received into Trần Nhật
Duậts army, in which Chao Chung was appointed to be an officer.
Therefore, Nhật Duật was the general who gained most merit in our peoples
victory over the Yuan enemy.
Thus, subsequent to the victory at A Lỗ, under the command of Chiu
Thnh Vương, Hoi Văn Hầu Quốc Toản, Nguyễn Khoi and Trần Nhật Duật our
troops proceeded to penetrate into Ty Kết and Hm Tử Quan in the 4th
month. These bases were established close to each other in the area of
Chu Giang District of present-day Hưng Yn Province; particularly, if Ty
Kết was the opposite village of Đng Kết in Đng Bnh commune of Chu
Giang District, the former was obviously situated right in the middle of
the Đ Mạc base ever commanded by the national hero Trần Bnh Trọng. For
the Đng Kết village is now only three kilometers far from the Red River,
that is, Bank Đ Mạc.
Accordingly, the counterattack in the 4th month of Ất Dậu (1285) was
aimed at reoccupying the military bases that were first founded by our
army and then occupied by the enemy two months earlier, and using them as
strong-points for liberating the Thăng Long capital.
The Victory at Chương Dương
Like the battle of Hm Tử, that of Chương Dương is not mentioned in
Chinese history books as it was a great loss for the Yuan. In ĐVSKTT 5,
p.47b, it is described as follows: On the 3rd of the 5th month, the two
kings were launching a violent thrust on the enemy in Trường Yn, cutting
off a lot of their heads and ears. On the 7th, [they were] informed that
So Tu moved his troops there from Thanh Ha. On the 10th, a man of ours
escaping from the enemys camp ran to the Imperial Park, reporting that
Generals Trần Quang Khải, Trần Quốc Toản, Trần Thng, Nguyễn Khả Lạp and
his brother, Nguyễn Truyền were commanding troops from the Routes to fight
the enemy in the palaces. The enemy was completely defeated; To Huan and
A Lo crossed the L River.
Thus, according to ĐVSKTT it is not until the 10th of the 5th month of
Ất Dậu (1285) that Emperor Nhn Tng and his father, who were commanding
the attack on Trường Yn, were informed of the victory at Chương Dương by
a soldier of ours escaping from the enemys hands. The situation of war
might have been very urgent at that time. For Chương Dương was a base on
the front line not very far from the Thăng Long Capital, i.e. Chương Dương
Commune of Thường Tn District in present-day H Ty Province. Being a
line of defending their command post in Thăng Long, it might be the
concentrating place of a geat number of enemys troops. After occupying
Chương Dương, therefore, our troops proceeded to drive the enemy toward
their headquarters in Thăng Long, where a fierce battle, as it will be
seen, occurred with great losses for both sides. As has been mentioned
above, Emperor Nhn Tng was informed of the victory at Chương Dương on
the 10th of the 5th month. Nevertheless, it might have come earlier in the
4th month since in both An Nam Ch Lược 4, p.54 and Ching Shih Ta Tien Tzŭ
Lu of Yuan Wen Lei 41 p.27a8-9 it is said that our troops attacked and
reoccupied Thăng Long in that month. The significance of this victory was
appreciated and it made a strong impression on our military strategists,
just as what the talented general, Trần Quang Khải, remarked later:
Taking away the enemys spears in Chương Dương,
Capturing the Hồ (Denoting
to the invaders from the north.) troops in Hm Tử.
The Liberation of Thăng Long
Today, Chương Dương commune is located on the Red River, approximately
twenty kilometers south of H Nội Capital. So was it in the old days.
After forcing the enemy to retreat out of Chương Dương, therefore, our
troops resolved to pursue them, developing our victory into a campaign to
liberate the Thăng Long capital, which had been occupied three months
earlier. Such a historical fact, however, was not described in detail in
ĐVSKTT. The authors of Khm Định Việt Sử Thng Gim Cương Mục (7 p.41a5-6)
showed regretful that such a great fact had not been clearly recorded:
the victory over the enemy in Chương Dương to retake the imperial capital
was the greatest military success at that time. [Unfortunately,] the
earlier history books did not record it clearly.
By synthesizing various historical materials, particularly those of the
Chinese source, however, we can know that it was a great battle in which
both sides suffered great losses. On the part of our army, besides the
south army commanded by Emperor Nhn Tng and his father advancing from
Thanh Ha to liberate Trường Yn and Thin Trường, which were being
occupied by Chiao Chi and Tang Wu Tai respectively, our major armed
forces were totally concentrated near the Thăng Long capital and then
divided into two wings. The first wing commanded by the generals Trần
Quang Khải, Trần Quốc Toản, Trần Thng, Nguyễn Khắc Lạp and Nguyễn Truyền
was urgently pursuing the enemy on their way toward Thăng Long. The second
wing was commanded by Hưng Đạo Vương Trần Quốc Tuấn and his elder brother,
Hưng Ninh Vương Trần Quốc Tung, i.e. Tuệ Trung Thượng Sỹ. The latter wing
is not often mentioned in our history books and by researchers today. In
An Nan Chuan of Yuan Shih 209, p.8a7-10, however, it is very clearly
recorded: Our generals were assembled to discuss the Giaos
counteroffensive. Although they were defeated many times, they gathered
more and more troops. Without sufficient supplies, mandarins and troops
suffered hardships and many of them were killed. Troops and horses of the
Mongols could not manifest their talent, too. Eventually, they had to
abandon the [An Nam] capital, crossing the river toward the north side to
discuss the plan of retreat into Szu Ming. Chn Nan Wang agreed to
withdraw troops. That day, Liu Shih Ying fought fiercely with more than
twenty thousand men of Hưng Đạo Vương and Hưng Ninh Vương.
Obviously, it was when the enemy decided to withdraw from Thăng Long
that the brothers, Trần Quốc Tuấn and Trần Quốc Tung, commanded more than
twenty thousand men to fight with the enemys general Liu Shih Ying, who
had been driven out of the base of A Lỗ by Trần Hưng Đạo in the first
victory of our general counteroffensive. At that time, Liu Shih Ying was
appointed by To Huan to defend the rear of their withdrawal so that their
troops could have time to retreat out of Thăng Long safely.
In reality, the liberation of Thăng Long was a great campaign. The
descriptions in Ching Shih Ta Tien Tzŭ Lu in Yuan Wen Lei 41 p.27a9-b1 are
quite in accordance with what the enemys leaders discussed before
withdrawing out of Thăng Long: In their attack on Chien Hu Ma Jung at
Giang Khẩu, Trung Thnh Vươngs troops were partly killed and retreated.
Yet, their army and naval forces proceeded to besiege [our] command post
thickly. Many of them were killed, but their reinforcements became more
and more crowded. Though having attempted to fight extremely hard all day,
mandarins and troops, due to lack of weapons, had to retreat out of their
citadel to make camps beyond the river; thereafter, they were ordered to
withdraw.
Thus, the campaign to liberate Thăng Long in which our major forces
were mostly mobilized and commanded by such most gifted generals as Trần
Hưng Đạo, Trần Quốc Tung, Trần Quang Khải, and so on proceeded so fiercely
and gloriously. With our thrusts from many different directions, the enemy
was surrounded by many rings of our troops in some battles we can know
today such as the battle of Giang Khẩu, i.e. Hng Buồm Street in
present-day H Nội, where Trung Thnh Vương defeated Chien Hu Ma Jung;
particularly the fierce battle of Trần Hưng Đạo and Trần Quốc Tungs
troops with Liu Shih Yings.
As has been said above, the campaign must have started in the 4th month
of Ất Dậu (1285). According to An Nam Ch Lược 4 p.54, however, up to the
5th of the 5th month Chiao Chis troops had fought with our troops in the
capital before they crossed the river to meet with To Huan and finally
withdrew with him on the 6th of the 5th month: The 5th, Đinh Sửu, of the
5th month Chiao Chi and Wan Hu set up an ambush in the citadel to shoot
arrows [at the An Nam troops]. The following day, they withdrew across the
L River. Chiao Chi might be the commander of troops who had occupied
Trường Yn and Thin Trường and had then been driven away by Emperor Nhn
Tng on the 3rd of the 5th month as recorded in ĐVSKTT. Thereafter, they
retreated into Thăng Long in the hope of uniting with To Huans troops to
launch another attack. On their arrival at Thăng Long, however, To Huan
had ordered an entire retreat and they moved north with him after setting
up some ambush and shooting inside the citadel as recorded by L Sực.
Thus, from the start of our besieging the enemy to their withdrawal out
of the capital the campaign of liberating Thăng Long lasted for at least
several weeks. It was a prolonged battle since To Huan had attempted to
hold to our capital whereas our army resolved to drive them out.
Therefore, exactly as recorded in ĐVSKTT, Emperor Nhn Tng had not been
reported on this victory until the 10th of the 5th month.
The Battle of Như Nguyệt and General Trần Quốc Toảns Sacrifice
Having withdrawn out of Thăng Long on the 6th of the 5th month, To
Huans troops moved toward the Như Nguyệt River, where a battle was taking
place, as recorded in Chinese history books, and a Vietnamese commander
sacrificed himself, that is, Hoi Văn Hầu Trần Quốc Toản. In the words of
An Nan Chuan of Yuan Shih 209 p.8a10: Mandarins and troops reached the
Như Nguyệt River when Hoi Văn Hầu, by order of Nhật Huyn, came
fighting. Ching Shih Ta Tien Tzŭ Lu of Yuan Wen Lei 41 p.27b1-2 says: On
[our armys] arrival at the Như Nguyệt River, Hoi Văn Hầu, pursuing [us]
by order of Nhật Huyn, was killed.
The battle is not mentioned in our history books. However, in an
account of the military conference at Bnh Than in the 10th month of Nhm
Ngọ (1282), where Hoi Văn Hầu Trần Quốc Toản, due to his young age, was
not allowed to attend, ĐVSKTT says: So shameful and angry that he was
unaware of having squashed an orange in his hand. On his return home, he
mobilized his servants and relatives, more than 1000 in number, had
weapons made and fighting boats built, writing six words destroying
strong enemy for kings sake on a large flag. Later, in the face of the
enemy, he himself was always the spearhead of our armys advance. Seeing
him, no one of the enemy dared to fight against. At his death, King showed
extremely regretful, writing a verse of mourning and conferring the
posthumous title Vương in memory of him. Thus, although it does not
record the battle of Như Nguyệt, ĐVSKTT indirectly mentions the heroic
sacrifice of Hoi Văn Hầu in this battle through its account of his death
and Emperor Nhn Tngs regret.
The Victory at Ty Kết: Cutting Off So Tus Head According to ĐVSKTT 5
p.47a, while our troops were pursuing the enemy, they were informed on the
7th of the 5th month of Ất Dậu (1285) that So Tu moved his troops from
Thanh Ha (). On the 17th day, So Tu and Wu Ma Er launched an attack [on
our troops] on the Thin Mạc River from the sea, intending to gather their
troops in the capital to assist each other (...). On the 20th day, the two
kings deployed troops at the ferry Đại Mang. A Yuan officer, Chang Hsien,
surrendered. The same day, our troops defeated the enemy at Ty Kết,
cutting off So Tus head and killing many of his troops. At midnight, Wu
Ma Er fled across the estuary of Thanh Ha. The two kings could not pursue
him but captured more than 50,000 of his troops. With only one big ship,
Wu Ma Er fled to the sea (). Seeing So Tus head, the King said
pitifully, As being servants, let us do like this. Then, taking off his
robe, with which he ordered his officials to cover So Tus head before
burial. But later, by his secret order, the head was soaked in oil [and
hanged up publicly] as a punishment because So Tu, on the pretext of
taking the route, had invaded our country for three years.
That was the process of the battle of Ty Kết and So Tus death
according to ĐVSKTT. In Chinese historical materials the event above is
rather differently recorded, let alone some contradictions among them. Pen
Chi of Yuan Shih 13 p.9b10-11, for instance, says: Trần Nhật Huyn fled
to the port. Chn Nan Wang ordered Li Hng to pursue him, [but he was]
defeated. Due to unfavorable weather and then epidemics, [our] troops
wanted to retreat into Szu Ming in the north. [Chn Nan Wang] ordered So
Tu to move troops back to L. The An Nan [troops] pursued [our troops].
So Tu fought but was killed. Thus, obviously So Tu had been ordered by
To Huan to move his troops down to the south, in L and Việt L of
Champa, i.e, the present-day provinces of Quảng Trị and Thừa Thin.
Nevertheless, So Tu Chuan of Yuan Shih 129 p.7b9-10 says: To Huan
ordered So Tu to halt his troops in Thin Trường, approximately more than
200 miles from the headquarters, to seek supplies. Suddenly the king
issued the order of withdrawal. To Huan withdrew his troops, informing So
Tu of nothing. Later, the latter was told by Giao Chỉ [people] but he did
not believe. When he reached the headquarters, they were empty. Giao Chỉ
[troops] stopped him on the Cn Mn River. So Tu fought against them but
was killed. Accordingly, So Tu had not been ordered to deploy his troops
in L and Việt L but in Thin Trường so that he could not learn of To
Huans withdrawal until he reached Thăng Long.
In the meantime, An Nam Ch Lược 4 p.54 affirms: Having then learned
of the great armys withdrawal, So Tu led his troops northward from Thanh
Ha. On their way they fought with An Nam [troops] day and night. At Bi
Khanh, Li Chiao Chang, a general under So Tus command, turned on the
army. So Tus horse fell into water and he died. Wu Ma Er and Wan Hu Liu
Kuei fled to the sea in their light boats. Following them was Hsiao Li,
who, without any hope to escape, intended to cut his own throat. Seeing
this, the Trần king ordered his rescue.
Thus, So Tu Chuan and An Nam Ch Lược agree on the fact that So Tu
moved his troops from Thanh Ha to the plains of north Vietnam but they
have different accounts of the subsequent events. The Cn Mn River, where
So Tu is said to have been killed in So Tu Chuan cited above, is
identified, in Section Sơn Xuyn of Đại Nam Nhất Thống Ch, with the Thị
Cầu River. Is it then true that So Tu was killed in the battle of Như
Nguyệt?
The answer may be found in An Nam Ch Lược and ĐVSKTT. The former says
that when So Tus troops reached Bi Khanh, one of his officers, Li Chiao
Chang, betrayed them. Chang guided Đại Việt troops to fight So Tu and they
cut off his head when he fell into the river with his horse. Meanwhile,
the latter says that Emperor Nhn Tng and his father reached Đại Mang Bộ
when an officer of the Yuan army, Chang Hsien, surrendered. Thus, Li Chiao
Chang is none other than Chang Hsien; and Đại Mang Bộ is Bi Khanh. It was
on the day of Chang Hsiens surrender that the Đại Việt army under the
command of Emperor Nhn Tng and the emperor-father won the battle,
cutting off So Tus head and driving Wu Ma Er and Liu Kuei to the sea.
Thus the southern wing of the Yuan army was completely annihilated.
The Victory at Vạn Kiếp
At the same time of our armys crucial victory in the south, the
campaign of pursuing the enemys forces in the north was urgently carried
on by Trần Hưng Đạo. After their defeat on the Như Nguyệt River, To
Huans troops moved down to Vạn Kiếp, where they encountered Trần Hưng
Đạos troops. According to ĐVSKTT 5 p.47b, On the 20th day () Hưng Đạo
Vương fought with To Huan and Li Hng in Vạn Kiếp. The enemy was defeated
and many of them were drowned. Li Hng ordered troops to protect To Huan
in their withdrawal to Szu Ming. Li Hng was killed with one of our
troops poisoned arrows piercing his left knee. Hiding To Huan among
bronze furniture, Pi Chiang Li Kuan gathered the remaining fifty thousand
men and fled to the north. Hưng Đạo Vương pursued them to Szu Ming, using
poisoned arrows to kill Li Kuan. The Yuan troops broke completely.
All the Chinese historical materials do not mention the battle of Vạn
Kiếp, but they have accounts of the battle on the Sch River. An Nan Chuan
of Yuan Shih 209 p.8a10-12 says: Reaching the Sch River, [our army] made
a floating bridge to cross the river () Our troops were getting ready to
cross the river when their troops in ambush rushed out from the forests.
Mandarins and troops, most of whom were drowned, had to fight their way
out of the land of Giao Chỉ. The troops of Tang Wu Tai had to use
post-horses to report the news [to the court]. It is similarly recorded
in Ching Shih Ta Tien Tzu Lu in Yuan Wen Lei 41 p.27b2: On the Sch
River, their troops lying in ambush rushed out. Mandarin and troops
competed with each other [to cross the river]. The floating bridge broke
down and most of them were drowned. In An Nam Ch Lược 4, p.54, it is
somewhat different: An Nam troops advanced toward the Nam Sch River. Yu
Chng Li Hng fought against them in the rear, cutting down Trần Thiệu, a
strong officer of Hưng Đạo Vương.
The Sch River mentioned in Yuan Shih and Ching Shih Ta Tien Tzŭ Lu is
called the Nam Sch in An Nam Ch Lược. According to Khm Định Việt Sử
Thng Gim Cương Mục Tiền Bin 5 p.22a3, it is in Nam Sch Prefecture of
present-day Hải Dương Province. Naturally, the battle of the Sch River
might not occur in Nam Sch Prefecture, which was then not on the way of
To Huan withdrawal. The Sch River must be close to Vạn Kiếp, where the
battle occurred between Trần Hưng Đạos and To Huans troops as recorded
in ĐVSKTT. The Sch River, therefore, must be the Thương River; and thus
the battle of the Sch River mentioned in Chinese historical documents is
the battle of Vạn Kiếp in ĐVSKTT. It was an abrupt ambush that made To
Huans great army tread on each other to flee and many of them were killed
when the floating bridge broke down.
According to Pen Chi of Yuan Shih 13 p.9b11-12, the reason To Huan
could flee to Szu Ming was due to Li Hngs attempt to fight fiercely with
Trần Hưng Đạo: (On the Mậu Tuất day of the 5th month) Hng fought in the
rear to protect Chn Nan Wang. A poisoned arrow pierced his left knee. Due
to the effect of poison, he died in Szu Ming. In order to cross the
border, however, To Huans defeated troops had to face another ambush in
Vĩnh Bnh, which was recorded only on the tombstone of Li Hng and cited
by Yao Sui (1238-1313) in Mu An Chi 12 p.8b5: The enemy closed the
frontier pass in Vĩnh Bnh, using poisoned arrows to hurt him on the knee.
He attempted to fight his way across the border. When reaching Szu Ming,
he died because of the effect of poison. This battle is not mentioned in
Li Hng Chuan of Yuan Shih 129 p.9a12-11b5: The barbarian troops
pursued, storming [our] armys rear. Wang (i.e. To Huan) changed his
order at once, posting Li Hng to the rear to secure our armys
withdrawal. Hng was pierced with a poisoned arrow on the knee. A soldier
had to carry him to Szu Ming, where he died due to the poison. He was then
at the age fifty.
The Victory at Ph Ninh
While Trần Hưng Đạo pursued To Huans troops in the north-east, Trần
Nhật Duật drove Na Su La Tings troops on their way back to Yun Nan. The
latter troops are not mentioned in Pen Chi and An Nan Chuan of Yuan Shih
to be among To Huans invading armed forces in our country. They are
merely recorded in Na Su La Ting Chuan Fu of Yuan Shih 125, p.3b, where
the date of Chih Yuan 22 (1285) is mistaken for Chih Yuan 32 (1295). It
says: In Chih Yuan 22, Na Su La Ting commanded 1000 troops of Ho La
Chang) (Qarajang, that is Wu Tuan troops of Yun Nan. [LMT]) and Mongols,
following Crown Prince To Huan to march into Giao Chỉ. Due to his merit,
he was awarded 2000 coins of silver.
In our history books Na Su La Tings troops, too, were not mentioned
until Chiu Văn Vương Trần Nhật Duậts death in 1330. In an account of
Trần Nhật Duậts participation in the anti-Ming war of 1285, ĐVSKTT 7
p.3a7-b3 says: Toward the end of Thiệu Bảo, he was defending Camp Thu Vật
in Tuyn Quang. When the Yuan enemy had just come [to our country], Chiu
Quốc reported [to the king]: Chiu Văn in Tuyn Quang might have called
the Yuan enemy in. (He said so because Nhật Duật liked making friends
with Sung people.) When Tuyn Quang was lost, Nhật Duật withdrew
downstream. The enemy pursued him along the river banks but he attempted
to halt them. Seeing that they moved so slowly, he said to our troops:
Generally the pursuing troops move very quickly, but in this case the
enemy is moving very slowly. I think that there may be other troops
standing ahead. Then he sent a man to watch, who reported later that a
troop of the enemy was posted on the lower river. He ordered his troops to
flee from the river.
Thus, when Na Su La Ting moved his troops along the Red River, from Yun
Nan down to Thăng Long, Trần Nhật Duậts troops stopped them and then
withdrew by the end of Thiệu Bảo, i.e. the years 1284-1285. Therefore,
when To Huan held a conference of his staff in Thăng Long and made a
decision of withdrawal, Na Su La Ting must have been appointed to withdraw
the north-western wing toward Yun Nan. And on their way of withdrawal,
they encountered our troops violent attack commanded by H Đặc and H
Chương.
In an account of the movement of To Huan and Wu Ma Ers troops from
the sea to attack our base at Thin Mạc on the 17th of the 5th month of Ất
Dậu (1285), ĐVSKTT p.47 says: When the enemy reached Ph Ninh District,
the official of the district, H Đặc, commanded his men to defend Trỉ Sơn
against them. The enemys troops were encamped at the cave Cự Đ. Đặc
ordered his men to make human forms of bamboo clad in genuine clothes,
which were repeatedly moved out of and into the district at night [to
deceive the enemy into thinking that there existed a great number of our
resistant troops]. Moreover, he had holes drilled on the big trees, in
which arrows were fixed through to deceive the enemy into thinking that
our men were so strong that they could shoot through big trees with
arrows. Accordingly, the enemy was frightened of fighting with us.
Immediately, our troops rushed out to liquidate them. At A Lạp, Đặc had a
floating bridge built for the troops to cross the river. In this pursuit
he was killed. His brother, Chương, was captured but then escaped with
some flags and uniforms taken from the enemys troops, which he submitted
to the king and suggested that, with those flags and uniforms, our troops
could disguise themselves as the enemys troops to penetrate into their
camps. Due to that plan, our army could annihilate the enemy.
The fact of our armys fight against Na Su La Ting has usually been
misunderstood since, in ĐVSKTT, it is recorded in a mixed account of Wu Ma
Er and So Tus attack on our armys position at Thin Mạc. Recognizing
this confusion, the author of Khm Định Việt Sử Thng Gim Cương Mục 7
p.41b1-3 says: So Tu advanced from the sea to attack Thin Mạc whereas
his patrol moved to the district of Ph Ninh, where it would take them
about three or four days to move from the former position. Naturally, this
was not the case but some mistake alone. Let us study it later. In
reality, there is not any false account in ĐVSKTT. Yet, it is due to its
combination of the two facts mentioned above in the same context that some
confusion might be made by the reader. Ph Ninh was a district in what is
now Ph Thọ Province. As regards the cave Cự Đ, it is not found today but
Tử Đ Commune, which is said in H Đặcs posthumous record to be his
native village, is located in Ph Ninh District. Similarly, the position
named A Lạp is not found today but it is recorded in Đồng Khnh Địa Dư Ch
that the communes An Lạp and Đức Lạp were situated in Lập Thạch District
of Sơn Ty Province. Thus, it may be possible that Cự Đ is another name
of Tử Đ and A Lạp of An Lạp. Hence, the battles in which H Đặc and H
Chương were involved might occur along the Red River in present-day Ph
Thọ Province.
The Triumphant March into Thăng Long
After driving the enemy out of the country in the glorious battles of
Vạn Kiếp, Ph Ninh, Emperor Nhn Tng, his emperor-father and generals
Hưng Đạo Vương Trần Quốc Tuấn, Chiu Minh Vương Trần Quang Khải, Hưng Ninh
Vương Trần Quốc Tung, and so on, triumphantly marched into Thăng Long
Capital amid the cheers of ten thousands of troops and people of Thăng
long, who had completely broken down the plan of occupying and dominating
our people by the northern invaders. In the name of one of the outstanding
generals who had commanded the campaign to liberate Thăng Long, Thượng
Tướng Thi Sư Trần Quang Khải, the direct administrator of the civil
government of the nation, wrote a poem, praising our peoples war of
resistance and appeal to the whole peoples efforts of establishing an
eternal peace for the Fatherland and the coming generations:
Stripping the enemy of spears in Chương Dương,
Capturing the Hồ troops in Hm Tử,
Make great efforts to establish
An eternal peace for our beloved country.
Translation by Đạo Sinh |
Huyền Thoại Duy Ma Cật